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ABSTRACT 
 
This article1 starts by critiquing two recent attempts to 
sociologically account for court delays in Mediterranean societies. 
                                                                                                             
∗   Senior Lecturer in Law & Anthropology, Head of Department of Civil 
Law, University of Malta, Malta; Executive Editor, Mediterranean Journal of 
Human Rights; LL.D., University of Malta; Ph.D. in Legal Anthropology, 
University of Durham. His central research interest is the ethnographic study of 
legal processes. 
1.   An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the European University 
Institute’s 10th Mediterranean Research meeting held in Montecatini Terme 
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The first account was produced by the sociologist David Nelken 
and uses the concept of legal culture to explore the causes of court 
delays in Italian criminal trials, while the second account was 
produced by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, who sees court 
delays in Crete as metonymically encapsulating a broader cultural 
context. It is argued that both accounts omit an important 
dimension of the issue, which is how such delays are produced and 
justified at the level of legal practice itself. By referring to the 
author’s fieldwork in the Maltese civil courts it is argued that court 
delays are best explained with reference to the social relations 
involved in legal practice, particularly those between lawyers and 
clients. Delays must be related to the ways in which lawyers see 
their role in litigation and these professional understandings are in 
turn connected to the kinds of expectations that their clients have 
of them. 
In this article particular attention will be paid to discursive 
invocations of these professional understandings by Maltese 
lawyers in the mid-1990’s, while resisting administrative reforms 
intended to streamline the procedures through which evidence is 
compiled in court. Delays were justified as necessary 
consequences of the lawyer’s professional role as locally 
understood. This is possible as, although often considered as 
synonymous with corruption, delay as a professional strategy is 
capable of signalling an extraordinary range of meanings. In 
particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and to 
traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of 
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the 
practical symbolism through which the specificity of “the legal” is 
enacted. Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific 
demands of their clients by performing specific professional 
understandings of legal representation as a matter of balancing 
between patronage and professional detachment. The generative 
matrix of these professional understandings can itself be located in 
the colonial encounters which shaped Maltese legal history and its 
mixed jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                             
 
(March 25-28, 2009).  I am grateful to the participants of the workshops for their 
helpful feedback and advice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although it evokes orientalising scholarly tropes about 
“weak states” in Southern Europe and “Mediterranean time,” the 
issue of delays in Mediterranean court litigation appears as an 
interesting target of ethnographic investigation. This is not only 
because these delays feature so prominently within internal and 
external discourses about corruption, the nature of the state and 
(the lack of) efficient governance, but also because the study of 
how they are created and justified in practice requires precisely the 
sort of detailed examination of the practices of judges, advocates 
and other court-room actors that is needed in order to overcome the 
dichotomy between “law in the books” and “law in action.”2  
Recent research by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld 
and the sociologist David Nelken can serve to indicate why 
researching court delays may produce a broad range of insights 
into Mediterranean states and societies. Nelken3 focuses on the 
causes of court delays in Italian criminal trials. He seeks an 
explanation in a range of factors drawn from both “internal legal 
culture” (including the organizational structure of the courts and a 
tendency to multiply procedural safeguards) and “external legal 
culture” (including such factors as the general tempo of Italian 
social life and the contested character of the state). By contrast, 
Herzfeld4 sees court delays in Crete as rooted in a broader cultural 
context, where the accusatory rhetoric of clients and the attitudes 
they bring to their dealings with state officials are matched by 
various defensive responses on the part of the bureaucrats, 
particularly delay. While these investigations consider court delays 
as a sort of window capable of giving us glimpses into very diverse 
aspects of Greek and Italian social and cultural organisation, they 
can also be criticized for neglecting to examine an important 
dimension of the phenomenon, which is that of legal practice itself. 
                                                                                                             
 2.  This distinction originated in the work of Roscoe Pound’s distinction 
and has now become the starting point of most research in the field of Law and 
Society. 
 3.  David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTRALIAN J. 
OF LEG. PHIL. (2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/lss/20 (Last 
visited November 9, 2011). 
 4.  MICHAEL HERZFELD, A PLACE IN HISTORY (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1991). 
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Asking how delays are experienced and justified at the level of 
legal practice means adopting an ethnographic perspective which 
focuses our attention less on generic features of culture and social 
structure, or even of legal culture,5 and more on the practical 
choices which must be made by the parties involved, particularly 
the lawyers, in the course of the actual litigation when these delays 
materialise and must be somehow justified or accounted for.  
Using the ethnography of legal practice as a prism through 
which to explore court delays requires a microscopic focus on the 
social relationships through which the work of legal representation 
is carried out, particularly those between lawyers, clients and 
judges, and it also requires us to remember that each of the parties 
involved is a “theorising agent”6 in his/her own right. As court 
litigation is largely controlled by legal professionals, such as 
lawyers and judges, their theories concerning appropriate 
professional practice must be interrogated in order to discover how 
court delays can coexist with a professional self-image. Framing 
the inquiry in this way follows the trend in the sociology of the 
professions to view professionalism as primarily an “emic” or folk-
concept and investigate it as such.7 It has the added advantage that 
it avoids making unwarranted and ethnocentric assumptions that 
the content of professional ideals is the same in all European legal 
systems, that the pursuit of these ideals necessarily leads lawyers 
to promote the public interest,8 or that delay is an inevitable result 
of corruption and a failure of professionalism.  
An ethnographic approach, which concentrates on the role 
played by professional ideals in the daily practice of lawyers, 
makes it possible to overcome what has been described as the: 
                                                                                                             
 5.  That is, assuming that legal culture is conceived as a distinctive way of 
structuring and organising the legal field. See, Nelken supra note 2.   
 6.  MICHAEL HERZFELD, ANTHROPOLOGY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989). 
 7.  See, Pierre Bourdieu, Thinking about Limits, in CULTURAL THEORY 
AND CULTURAL CHANGE 42 (Mike Featherstone ed., Sage, London, 1992); 
TERRENCE JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (Macmillan, London, 1972); 
Sarah Cant & Ursula Sharma, Reflexivity, ethnography and the professions 
(complementary medicine). Watching you watching me watching you (and 
writing about both of us), EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE SOC. REV. 246 (Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers 1998). 
 8. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, (Oxford University Press, 
New York & Oxford, 1989). 
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“arbitrary separation between the sociology of law and the 
sociology of the legal profession.”9 Such an approach makes 
visible the complex inter-relationships between professional ideals 
and the specific social and cultural contexts in which they are 
implemented. At the same time a purely ethnographic, “present-
tense” approach itself needs to be embedded within the broader 
social and historical framework provided by social anthropology.  
 
II. FIELDWORK IN MALTA 
 
This paper will draw on my anthropological fieldwork, 
carried out in the Mediterranean island-state of Malta, to examine 
the ways in which Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke 
professional ideals in the course of their legal practice and when 
confronting recent administrative reforms to the court procedures 
for compiling evidence. These themes will here be approached 
from the standpoint of my fieldwork on legal practice in Malta. 
Initial fieldwork was carried out for a total of twenty-two months 
between April 1996 and May 1997, followed by shorter periods of 
field research in 2002 and 2006.10 It was based on participant 
observation in the offices of four Maltese lawyers11 and in the civil 
courts. I had access to these offices because I have a law degree, 
having trained in law before studying anthropology. My research 
concentrated on the ways in which lawyers and clients negotiate 
the “facts” of the case, the production of evidence during court 
litigation and its assessment during adjudication. The aim was to 
acquire a holistic understanding of Maltese legal representation in 
civil litigation by exploring the social relations through which it is 
carried out. Through focusing on legal practice, I tried to build on 
my own legal background so as to carry out a more reflexive and 
practice-orientated ethnography, of the sort that sociologist Pierre 
                                                                                                             
 9.  Ruth Buchanan, Constructing Virtual Justice in the Global Arena, 31:2 
L. & SOC. REV. 364 (1997). 
 10.  I am grateful to the Universities of Malta and Durham for funding my 
research. This was made possible through a staff scholarship by the University 
of Malta and an ORS grant on the part of the University of Durham. 
 11.  According to my calculations, there were during the period of my 
research close to three hundred lawyers involved in court litigation.   
544 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
 
 
Bourdieu has recommended.12 In 2010, I expanded the scope of 
my research to explore the historical development of court delays 
in Malta by means, primarily of documentary research. 
 
III. SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION 
 
This paper will initially focus on the pressures clients place 
on their lawyers in office interviews. Against this backdrop, the 
way Maltese lawyers interpret and invoke professional ideals in 
their legal practice will be explored. This will be followed by an 
ethnographically informed case study of the reforms attempted by 
the Maltese government in 1996 to court procedures for compiling 
evidence, which will attempt to account for the failure of these 
reforms and in the process highlight the defensive and largely 
obstructive responses of legal professionals and the role played by 
professional ideals in legitimating these responses. This article will 
then explore how Maltese legal practice was described by 
practitioners in 1912 and relate this to the trends which were 
observed during my fieldwork. Finally, some more general 
conclusions about the character of the Maltese legal system will be 
attempted. 
 
IV. LAWYER/CLIENT INTERVIEWS 
 
Office interviews with lawyers, in which clients 
communicate the facts and receive legal advice and guidance, are 
an indispensable starting point to explore the social uses of 
professional ideologies. These interviews are central to 
lawyer/client interaction as during their discussion of the case both 
parties will also informally negotiate their relationship. During my 
fieldwork, story-telling was the most prominent feature of the 
interviews I observed. While my training in law had led me to 
expect clients to state “facts” structured according to legal 
categories, what I experienced was a more confused and contested 
process. Rural and working class clients in particular would 
smuggle stories stressing their own morally upright behaviour 
                                                                                                             
 12.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1997). 
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within their narrative accounts of the facts. Such stories were told 
despite the inattention of lawyers and even though they seemed 
legally irrelevant. In one case, for instance, a small rural 
businessman seeking his lawyers’ help in some financial 
transactions, explained that he had always “walked straight,” (i.e., 
acted honourably) and that while he was prepared to give away 
free gifts, he could not tolerate being robbed by others. Similarly, a 
working-class widow who was trying to repatriate her husband’s 
money kept insisting with her lawyer that she did not want this 
money for herself, but so as to leave it to her children equally in 
the event of her death. The persistence of clients in recounting 
these personalised stories seemed even more paradoxical since 
lawyers told me that their only aim was to get the facts straight and 
disclaimed any interest in the moral qualities of their clients: “who 
should only be judged once.” 
Certain features of clients’ stories throw light on their 
significance. These narratives create moral sympathy for clients 
because they inject powerful cultural values into descriptions of 
past actions. This can be illustrated by the story of the rural 
businessman earlier mentioned. He talked about “walking 
straight”, because in Maltese “walking” is used metaphorically to 
morally evaluate the way in which a person relates to others. A 
person who “walks straight” is one who avoids corrupting social 
obligations which deviate one’s life-walk, impeding 
straightforward adherence to moral ideals. Consequently the 
businessman endowed himself with an honourable autonomy, 
which could be used to exert pressure on his lawyer,13 authorising 
him to express powerful emotions and thump on his desk in anger 
at being robbed. Through these stories, moreover, clients also try 
to translate their moral virtue into legal entitlement in their 
lawyers’ eyes. This is made explicit in the businessman’s case, 
since the expression: nimxi dritt, or “I walk straight” plays on the 
way dritt in Maltese not only means straightness, but also a legal 
right, or even the undifferentiated whole of legal and moral rules.  
                                                                                                             
 13.  Analogously, by stressing her impartial concern for her children, the 
widow sought to portray herself as a good wife and mother as the role was 
traditionally conceived in Malta.  
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This analysis indicates that clients’ narratives are best 
understood not solely as ways of communicating the facts, but also 
as attempts to control their relationships with their lawyers. They 
operate as what linguist Deborah Tannen14 has called: 
“involvement strategies,” since they are a medium through which 
clients can involve lawyers in personal relationships based on 
shared moral values, obliging them to actively “advocate” their 
interests. Anthropologists have observed such patronage 
relationships in Malta15 and elsewhere in the Mediterranean 
region.16 Their ideological structure has been aptly described as: 
“the moral englobing of political asymmetry that allows the client 
to maintain self-respect while gaining material advantage.”17 
Clients use various strategies to try to create these patronage 
relationships.18     
These efforts to create patronage derive from complex 
social causes, which can only be briefly indicated here. Some seem 
to be common to other Mediterranean societies. Thus, Herzfeld19 
has related the need for mechanisms of social incorporation in 
Greek society to the absence of a fully integrated capitalist 
economy, the competitive and hostile character of extra-familial 
social relations and the weakness and relative youth of the nation-
state.20 Other causes relate more specifically to Malta, such as the 
                                                                                                             
 14.  DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING VOICES: REPETITION, DIALOGUE AND 
IMAGERY IN CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989). 
 15.  JEREMY BOISSEVAIN, SAINTS AND FIREWORKS: RELIGION AND POLITICS 
IN RURAL MALTA (Progress Press Co. Ltd, Valletta, Malta, 1993). 
 16.  JOHN K CAMPBELL, HONOUR, FAMILY, AND PATRONAGE (Oxford 
University Press, New York & Oxford, 1974). 
 17.  Michael Herzfeld, ‘As In Your Own House:’ Hospitality, Ethnography 
and the Stereotype of Mediterranean Society, in HONOUR AND SHAME AND THE 
UNITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 86 (Gilmore ed., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1987). 
 18.  For instance, I often observed Maltese clients give gifts to their lawyers 
and trying to involve them in discussions about non-legal matters. Gifts ranged 
from the proverbial bottle of whisky in Christmas to providing free access to a 
beach resort owned by the client. 
 19.  MICHAEL HERZFELD, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE: 
EXPLORING THE SYMBOLIC ROOTS OF WESTERN BUREAUCRACY (Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 1993). 
 20.   Herzfeld explains that consequently the Greek nation-state has not 
absorbed into itself all the idioms of social identity; so that these can function 
independently of and be employed to contest the state structure. Id. 
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historically derived sense of alienation of the Maltese from a state 
apparatus belonging to a foreign colonial power21 or the modelling 
of political power on Catholic religion with its stress on saintly 
mediators between person and God.22 In a small-scale society 
impersonality can become a scarce (and valued) commodity. As 
one Maltese proverb has it: “Malta is small and people are 
known.”23      
Popular perceptions of lawyers and the court system may 
also motivate clients to try to create patronage relationships. 
Rampant delays in litigation have given a bad name to the Maltese 
courts and clients may seek their lawyers’ patronage to ensure that 
their cases are handled efficiently. The ambiguous social role of 
lawyers as mediators between their clients and the state legal 
system may make it difficult to discover whose side the lawyer is 
on. If middle-class clients complained about the links between 
lawyers and criminals, those coming from a rural or working-class 
background saw lawyers as part of a dominating and exploitative 
upper class. Significantly, it is the clients who were the most 
socially distant from the urban professional classes who often 
seemed to be trying hardest to involve their lawyers in patronage 
relationships.   
It seems clear, therefore, that Maltese lawyers often come 
under intense pressure from clients, especially those coming from a 
rural or lower-class background, who try to create personal 
relationships with them in order to control the way they carry out 
their work. Clients make indirect attempts to develop these 
patronage ties, evoking moral sympathy through the way they 
narrate the “facts” of the case. This strategy is difficult to rebuff, 
given the “inescapably moral”24 quality of the stories through 
which the “facts” are communicated.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 21.  EDWARD L. ZAMMIT, A COLONIAL INHERITANCE: MALTESE 
PERCEPTIONS OF WORK, POWER AND CLASS STRUCTURE WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT (Malta University Press, Malta, 1984). 
 22.  BOISSEVAIN, supra note 14. 
 23.  In Maltese this reads: “Malta zghira u n-nies maghrufa.” 
 24.  JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 50 (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1990). 
548 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
 
 
V. THE SOCIAL USES OF PROFESSIONAL IDEALS 
 
Lawyers’ professional ideals have here been approached 
from the standpoint of their interviews with clients. This is because 
these ideals are not simply abstract principles to which lawyers pay 
lip-service. On the contrary, they have a direct practical 
application, helping to equip lawyers to cope with the pressures 
clients place on them. These social uses of professional ideals are 
revealed by the way they are taught to new generations of lawyers. 
Until recently professional ethics were not fully incorporated into 
the standard academic curriculum of the University of Malta. They 
are still mostly transmitted to young lawyers by practitioners 
during the liminal period of transition from the University to legal 
practice.25 Moreover a Maltese code of professional ethics for 
lawyers was only published in 1996.26 Thus the transmission of 
professional ideology is still largely seen as part of a process of 
oral socialisation through which young lawyers learn to view 
themselves as members of a professional community with its own 
distinct interests.  
An important practical use of professional ideals is that of 
justifying lawyers’ non-response to their clients’ stories. During 
my fieldwork, I often observed lawyers keeping a sceptical 
distance based on the need to preserve their professional 
detachment. This refusal to fully endorse clients’ narratives was 
signalled by the ironical comments lawyers sometimes made, the 
contextual absurdity of which showed they were not taken in.27 A 
sense of professional detachment could also be transmitted through 
                                                                                                             
 25.  Generally professional ethics are taught in the final year of the LL.D. 
course, which was until very recently perceived as a period when the academic 
teaching of law was at an end, so that students concentrate on their 
apprenticeship and on preparing their theses. Professional ethics are also 
favourite subjects for speeches on such occasions as the granting of the 
professional warrant, or in seminars organised by the law students’ society.   
 26.  Reference is made to the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Advocates, 
published in 1996 by the Commission for the Administration of Justice, The 
Palace, Valletta, Malta. 
 27.  For instance, in one case, a landlord kept telling his lawyer what a 
gentlemanly relationship he enjoyed with his tenants, while he also sought 
advice on how he could legally increase the rent. His lawyer calmly observed 
that as the tenants were professional people, it was going to be difficult for the 
landlord to make fools of them!   
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formal clothing, the organisation of space in legal offices28 and an 
aloof attitude when interacting with clients. These invocations of 
professional ideals clearly reflect attempts by lawyers to resist 
entanglement in patron/client relationships.  
The connection between the professional ideals upheld by 
Maltese lawyers and their clients’ involvement strategies can be 
perceived by exploring the way the task of legal representation is 
described according to professional ideology. The comments of 
one established and highly respected lawyer are typical in this 
regard. When interviewed on this point, this lawyer made a 
distinction between the “case,” which the lawyer is duty bound to 
present to the court as effectively as possible, and “facts,” which 
are “in the hands of the client” to prove.29 He observed that the 
stories clients tell under oath and in the courtroom context are 
often very different from the ones they originally told their 
lawyers. Consequently facts should emerge in the courtroom 
setting of an oral hearing, which he termed a “search for truth” 
undertaken before the judge. He therefore objected to the use of 
written affidavits30 as an alternative way of collecting evidence; 
claiming that they tempted lawyers to write their clients’ stories for 
them and risk perjuring themselves. He also observed that he had 
never witnessed a signature in the absence of the person 
concerned.   
Thus, professional ideals portray legal representation as a 
process where the lawyer’s concern with the issues at stake is 
distinguished from that of her client. Lawyers are concerned solely 
with the “case,” consisting of the legal arguments and claims to be 
made.31 It is the client’s primary responsibility to prove the “facts,” 
on the basis of which these legal arguments are raised. This 
distinction establishes a conceptual boundary between the domain 
                                                                                                             
 28.  Professional detachment was conveyed by maintaining a spatial 
demarcation between the ‘front office,’ where clients wait and their files are 
located and the ‘inner office,’ where lawyers sit surrounded by law-books.  
 29.  In Maltese this reads: “Il-fatti f’idejn il-kljent.” 
 30.  An affidavit is a written statement of the client’s version of the facts. 
They are supposed to be precise reproductions of their stories and clients must 
confirm them on oath. Maltese judges are increasingly requesting the 
presentation of affidavits instead of oral testimony.   
 31.   Lawyers are prepared to accept more involvement with the facts in 
criminal cases. 
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of the client, which is one of potentially changeable oral stories of 
dubious credibility, and the domain of the lawyer, which is one of 
legally valid writing. By drawing such a boundary, lawyers escape 
responsibility for proving their clients’ stories, confining their role 
to legal argumentation. In fact, Maltese lawyers constantly assert 
their detachment through expressions like: “trying to win the case 
for the client,” which imply they have no personal interest in the 
outcome.32  
This professional model of legal representation is 
significant for two principal reasons. Firstly, it is almost 
diametrically opposed to the way most clients would like to 
construct their working relationships with lawyers. Whereas clients 
would like to start from a moral consensus with their lawyers 
concerning the facts of the case, the professional model requires 
lawyers to base their court-room representation on a prima facie 
assessment of the facts which is solely intended to clarify the legal 
issues involved. Clients often believe that once they take on a case, 
lawyers assume responsibility for ensuring a successful outcome in 
the court-room. By contrast, the professional model places the 
burden of producing convincing evidence firmly in the hands of 
the client, restricting the lawyer’s role to “purely legal” 
argumentation.33 Consequently, although the client might feel that 
this is unethical, the professional model authorises a lawyer to 
institute a court case on behalf of an insistent client even if the 
lawyer believes that he will lose the case because his evidence is 
not sufficiently persuasive or credible.34 Evidence belongs in the 
clients’ hands and lawyers are distanced from any responsibility 
for it.  
Secondly and more importantly, it seems clear that 
professional ideals which have the effect of distancing them from 
                                                                                                             
 32.  Strictly speaking, lawyers have no financial interest in winning law-
suits. This is because their fees are calculated according to an official tariff, 
according to such matters as the value of the object of the suit. Naturally, 
however, lawyers who consistently lose suits will probably fail to attract as 
many clients as others.  
 33.  Thus, clients’ views on affidavits contrast to those of lawyers. In fact, 
clients complained to me that their lawyers had barely glanced at the affidavits 
they wrote. While clients expected their lawyers to take responsibility for the 
evidence, this is precisely what the latter wanted to avoid.  
 34.  Of course the lawyer has a recognised duty to inform his client that he 
thinks he will lose the case. 
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responsibility for the “facts” can be very useful to lawyers in a 
social context where clients try to use their narration of the “facts” 
to implicate them in patronage relationships. I suggest that Maltese 
lawyers favour an extensive interpretation of the meaning of 
professional detachment when representing clients in litigation 
precisely because it allows them to escape the pressures which 
clients exert through the medium of the “facts.” If this is correct, 
then it shows how the interpretation of professional ideals is 
influenced by the practical context in which it occurs.          
This analysis is open to the objection that I have over-
emphasised the homogeneity of Maltese lawyers, ignoring the 
occupational differentiation of the profession and possible 
differences in style and approach which might lead to different 
interpretations of professionalism. However, the internal 
differentiation of the Maltese legal profession is not very great. My 
statistics35 show that when my ethnographic research commenced 
in the mid 1990’s, 44% of lawyers were sole private practitioners, 
28% were employed with law-firms and 13% with the 
Government. The remainder was either non-practising or employed 
with various private companies. Moreover, Maltese law-firms are 
usually small partnerships where the type of work closely 
resembles that of a sole practitioner. Indeed, only four of the law-
firms listed in 1994 had a membership of seven or more and the 
largest of these grouped eleven lawyers. In the exercise of their 
profession, most firm lawyers find that it is important to be flexible 
and to be prepared to carry out different types of work, even if they 
have specialised in certain fields.36 
Stylistic differences in handling clients exist and they do 
seem to be broadly correlated to occupational status. Sole 
practitioners are more likely to devote time to listening to their 
clients and to provide some endorsement of their stories, while 
firm lawyers tend to place a higher premium on efficient time 
management. However most lawyers find it necessary to 
                                                                                                             
 35.  Data was culled from the ‘Legal and Court Directory’ produced by the 
Camera degli Avvocati, the Maltese lawyers’ association. The directory contains 
a list of practising lawyers which can be considered as fairly exhaustive, given 
that practically all practising lawyers are members. I consulted the 1994 and 
1992 issues of this Directory.    
 36.  This is due to the small size of Malta, which means that the number of 
legal jobs available in any area of practice is necessarily limited.    
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strategically balance between patronage and professionalism when 
handling clients. The attractions of professionalism are obvious, 
since it frees lawyers from clients’ pressures and allows greater 
efficiency. Yet there are important reasons why even firm lawyers 
find that they cannot avoid acting as if they were, to some extent, 
their clients’ patrons.37 Thus, as already observed, many clients 
want to create patronage relationships and lawyers, who operate in 
a very competitive market, are eager not to alienate them. 
Moreover certain clients do not feel able to confide secrets to their 
lawyers unless they have a personal relationship with them.38 
Finally, as was previously argued, patronage relations are in a way 
in-built into clients’ stories.  
It follows that despite the existence of occupational and 
stylistic differences among Maltese lawyers, they generally attempt 
to strike a balance by providing limited endorsement of their 
clients’ narratives while also trying to emphasise their professional 
detachment from them. Few lawyers are willing to forego the 
benefits of belonging to the “Professjoni Libera,” or “free 
profession” as they call it, by wholeheartedly identifying 
themselves with their clients in patronage relationships. Indeed, 
one such case reported to me is highly instructive. The lawyer 
concerned is criticised by some of his colleagues both because he 
develops close patronage relations with his clients and because he 
drafts long, verbose, affidavits on their behalf. This criticism 
clearly shows how lawyers equate professional detachment, in the 
sense of keeping the necessary distance from the client, with 
professional legal representation, in the sense of confining oneself 
to the legal issues and leaving ultimate responsibility for the 
“facts” to the client.39 Clearly, most Maltese lawyers believe their 
                                                                                                             
 37.  By, for instance, occasionally waiving payment for legal advice and 
giving more attention to clients.   
 38.  JULIETTE DU BOULAY, PORTRAIT OF A GREEK MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974). 
 39.  A similar model of legal representation is found in the Maltese code of 
ethics for lawyers (op. cit.). Significantly, this code prescribes that an advocate 
representing clients in civil litigation: “is under a duty to say on behalf of the 
client what the client should properly say for himself or herself if the client were 
allowed to plead for himself or herself and possessed the requisite skill, 
knowledge and legal training” (Rule 11, Part IV, Cap 1). By requiring advocates 
to restrict their representation to what clients should “properly” say, this code 
prevents their complete identification with clients.  
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professional detachment requires them to performatively avoid 
excessive involvement with the “facts,” viewed as a potential 
source of “symbolic pollution,” in Mary Douglas’ terms.40  
 
VI. THE PROCEDURAL REFORMS OF 1996 
 
Having explored the way lawyers interpret professional 
ideals in the ordinary course of their legal practice, it is now 
possible to reach a deeper understanding of the obstacles impeding 
certain reforms which the Maltese Government carried out in 1996 
to the system by which evidence is compiled in court. By focusing 
on this particular case-study, the broader social effects of 
professional ideals will be highlighted. Firstly, however, it is 
necessary to explain the pre-1996 system for compilation of 
evidence and the public discontent which motivated these reforms 
in the first place. 
Litigation before the Maltese civil courts occurs in two 
successive phases. A preliminary written phase, in which the 
litigants send each other their respective written legal claims and 
statements of defence, is followed by an oral phase when the 
parties and their witnesses testify and the lawyers question 
witnesses and present their own arguments. During the written 
phase and together with their legal claims, the litigants are obliged 
to send each other a “declaration of facts” which should contain 
their respective statements of the “facts” at stake. Together with 
this, each of the litigants is also expected to file a list of the 
documents and a list of the witnesses which s/he intends to 
produce during the case. After the preliminary exchange of their 
written claims, the case then shifts to the oral stage where each of 
the litigants has a chance to testify and to produce any witnesses 
mentioned in her list. Testimony is usually heard in a certain order: 
starting from the plaintiff and continuing with his witnesses and 
followed by the defendant and his witnesses. Witnesses are first 
examined by the lawyer for the party who summoned them and 
then cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. Their replies are 
                                                                                                             
 40.  MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 
1988). 
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transcribed by the court clerk. Often, important documents are 
handed over to the court by witnesses in the course of testimony. 
After all the witnesses have been examined, the .judge defers the 
case so that he can pronounce his judgement. 
What this account omits are all the delays which are caused 
when this system is implemented in practice. These are due to 
various causes. For instance, litigants often find it impossible to 
summon all their witnesses to testify on the same day. 
Consequently, cases are usually postponed for three months so as 
to hear the testimony of new witnesses. Some litigants tend to 
name fifty or sixty witnesses and expect to be allowed to summon 
them all to testify! Additional problems are caused when particular 
witnesses do not come to court or cannot be traced and the case is 
normally put off to allow lawyers to try to contact these witnesses. 
There are many other causes of delay which cannot be mentioned 
here. It is important, however, to note that delays mostly arise 
during the oral phase of litigation, when testimony is being 
produced. Court delays had multiplied during the late 1990’s and 
remain a persistent cause for concern today.41 Thus, statistics given 
by the Minister of Justice for 199742 indicate that by the end of 
January 1997, there were a total of 22,861 cases pending before all 
the Maltese courts, many of which were pending before the civil 
courts.43 By comparison, government statistics44 indicate that at 
the end of March 2011, there were a total of 23,133 pending cases 
before all the Maltese courts.45 
                                                                                                             
 41.  See the report on the recent visit conducted in Malta by the Council of 
Europe’s Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Court Backlog under 
Scrutiny, TIMES OF MALTA, Nov. 24, 2011 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.).  
 42.  These figures were given by Justice Minister Charles Mangion in a 
reply to a Parliamentary Question. They were reproduced in The Times of Malta 
on March 5, 1997.  
 43.  Of these, 1067 cases were pending before the Court of Appeal; 8318 
before the Civil Courts, and 11,150 before the Magistrates’ Courts. 
 44.  Statistics for 2011 were culled from the reports published on the Malta 
Ministry of Justice’s website.  Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, available 
at http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/courtservices/Statistics/default.aspx (Last 
visited November 11, 2011). 
 45.  Of these, 1348 were pending before the Court of Appeal, 6450 before 
the Civil Courts, 15,223 before the Magistrates’ Courts and there were 112 
pending cases before the Criminal Court. In order to ensure comparability of this 
data with the that given in 1997, I have added together the data for pending Civil 
cases which was compiled on March 31, 2011 with the published data 
concerning pending Criminal cases of March 2011. The figure for the total 
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At the time increased media attention had begun to focus 
on the issue of court delays, as is still the case today. It is 
acknowledged as a serious problem which results in the denial of 
justice and alienates people from the courts.46 Partly in reaction to 
this growing public concern and in order to enhance the efficiency 
of the courts, the Maltese government in July 1996 enacted a law 
to reform various procedural rules.47 This law contained provisions 
relating to the trial of law-suits which caused controversy. In 
particular attention focused on the new procedure to be followed 
by judges when compiling evidence in civil trials.  
In terms of this new procedure, a pre-trial hearing was to be 
held before the first sitting in the case. The aim of this hearing in 
the words of the government minister, himself a lawyer, who 
introduced the amendments, was to allow the court to “identify and 
record the points of law and fact in contention and the proof to be 
given by each witness.”48 The second major innovation was that 
after the pre-trial hearing, judges were given the option of 
choosing the system by which evidence was to be heard. 
                                                                                                             
 
pending Appeal cases was reached by adding together the data concerning 
pending cases before the Constitutional Court, the Criminal Court of Appeal and 
the Civil Court of Appeal in both Gozo and Malta in its Superior and Inferior 
sections. The figure for the total pending Civil cases comprises cases pending 
before the Family court apart from those pending before the First Hall of the 
Civil court. The figure for the total pending cases before the Magistrates’ Court 
was reached by adding together all the pending Civil cases before the 
Magistrates’ Court together with all the Criminal cases for both Gozo and Malta 
and excluding the statistics for cases pending before the Small Claims tribunal, 
which did not exist in 1997.  
 46.   A good example of the tone of the comments made by the Maltese 
newspapers is represented by two newspaper editorials which both appeared 
during June 1997, while I was writing up my research. While the editorial of the 
conservative daily The Times emphasized the need to speed up court 
proceedings, that of the left-wing weekly It-Torca claimed “In the 
administration of justice, the citizen expects the legal process to be efficient 
(emphasis added), comprehensible and really just. The citizen is not satisfied on 
any one of these points.” 
 47. The law in question is Act 24 of 1996, which amended the Code of 
Organisation and Civil Procedure. The provisions of this law which concern us 
were brought into effect by means of a legal notice in 1996.  
 48.  J. M. Fenech, Procedural Law and the Courts, THE SUNDAY TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 1996 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). See also J. M. Fenech, Justice 
within a Reasonable Time, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996 (Malta, Allied 
Newspapers Ltd.); J. M. Fenech, Wake Up Minister, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May 
11, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). 
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Previously the principle was that all testimony had to be heard 
orally. Instead judges were now given the option of compiling all 
evidence by means of written affidavits prepared by parties and 
their witnesses and deposited in court.49 However, even if this 
“affidavit system” were to be chosen, the opposing lawyer was to 
continue to enjoy the facility of conducting an oral cross-
examination of parties and witnesses on the testimony contained in 
their affidavits. Finally, the third innovation was that judges were 
then to fix a date for a full hearing of testimony (if the evidence 
was to be compiled viva voce) or for hearing by cross-examination 
(if the affidavits system was selected). During this sitting all the 
oral testimony to be presented in the case was to be heard 
uninterruptedly. There were to be no adjournments except in very 
special circumstances. This contrasted with the previous system, in 
which witnesses were heard on several different sittings and 
adjournments were frequently granted. 
Before exploring these innovations further, it is important 
to consider the way they were implemented. The collective 
response of judges to the amendments was to introduce a new 
judicial role: that of the Master, which was not contemplated in the 
amendments.50 By agreement among the bench, one of the judges 
assumed this role and was entrusted with around 3,000 cases in 
which, to quote the current Chief Justice “very little was being 
done.”51 His task was to be that of conducting a pre-trial hearing in 
this case and in all new cases to be filed in the future. After he had 
clarified the points in issue and the proof to be made by different 
witnesses, he was to transfer these files to the other judges before 
whom the actual court sittings would be held. Consequently while 
the amendments had contemplated that all judges would hold a 
pre-trial hearing in every law-suit they adjudicated, the effect of 
the judges’ decision was that only one of the judges would conduct 
the pre-trial hearings. Moreover this judge would not be the one 
before whom these cases were actually heard. The Chief Justice 
justified these changes on the grounds that: 
                                                                                                             
 49.  Previously, the use of affidavits tended to be restricted to the testimony 
of the litigating parties themselves. 
 50.  The master system was modelled on English procedures. 
 51.  Joseph Said Pullicino, Chief Justice on effectiveness of amendments to 
the C.O.C.P, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jun. 1, 1997 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). 
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[I]n a situation like ours where the administrative 
infrastructure is lacking, where the number of 
judges was inadequate and the culture of accepting 
certain systems of control on the compilation of 
evidence and the regulation of the cause by the 
judge objected to, all these amendments, rigidly 
applied, could not have the desired beneficial effect 
without bringing about a traumatic experience. 
There was, on the contrary, the danger that this 
would bring about a total collapse of the system 
(emphasis added). It was principally for this reason, 
therefore, that through an administrative process–
which was not contemplated in the amendments and 
introduced clandestinely (emphasis added)–the 
system of the Master was introduced.52 
In November 1996, there was a change of Government. On 
meeting with the new Minister of Justice, the President of the 
Chamber of Advocates called for the abolition of the affidavits 
system, which was the second plank of the newly introduced 
reforms. He claimed that this worked against the conscience and 
professional training of lawyers. He hoped, however, that the 
Master system “would be operated more effectively.”53 Following 
this, there was mounting criticism of the new Master system from 
various lawyers and judges, on the grounds that it had only served 
to create another bottle-neck, since one judge could not possibly 
hold pre-trial hearings in 3,000 cases together with all the new law-
suits that were being filed.  
The next development occurred in April 1997, when a 
seminar was organised to discuss the implementation of the new 
amendments. Opening this seminar, the Chief Justice admitted that 
the Master system was not working as well as originally planned.54 
Then, in June 1997, the Minister of Justice announced the setting 
up of an Advisory Committee for the Law-Courts. The committee 
was given an extensive brief, which included continuous 
                                                                                                             
 52.  Id. 
 53.  R. Cremona, Chamber of Advocates meets new Justice Minister: Call 
for abolition of affidavits system, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996 (Malta, 
Allied Newspapers Ltd.).  
 54.  Pullicino, supra note 51. 
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monitoring of the situation and recommending changes to the laws, 
administrative set-up and the Master system in order to increase 
the efficiency of the courts. While I was unable to discover 
whether this committee still exists and what recommendations it 
might have made, the failure of the 1996 reforms to alter 
significantly the mode of trial in Malta was already clear by 
January 1999 when the President of the Chamber of Advocates 
delivered a speech in which he called on the legal profession to 
give the new Master system a proper try, asking them: “not to 
discard the system before attempting to employ it in its entirety.”55   
 
VII. PROFESSIONALLY DISTANCING LAW FROM FACT 
 
My reason for recounting the history of these failed reforms 
to trial procedures is to highlight the relationship all the 
protagonists drew between court delays and the manner in which 
evidence is compiled. They argued that there is a Maltese culture, 
or “ingrained mentality,” which resists greater control on the 
process of compilation of evidence.56 This mentality is so powerful 
that it induced judges to introduce the Master system, so as to 
avoid “a traumatic change [which could] lead to the total collapse 
of the system.”57 Moreover, this mentality had even subverted the 
Master system itself. However, in the light of the preceding 
discussion of the way Maltese lawyers interpret their professional 
role, the repeated failure of these reforms does not seem so 
surprising. If Maltese lawyers believe that professionalism is 
asserted through avoiding excessive involvement with the facts of 
the case by leaving them in the hands of their clients to prove, then 
they might not be too keen about reforms which operate precisely 
by obliging lawyers to take more responsibility for the factual 
aspect of cases. 
Taking more responsibility for the facts is the common 
thread which links the various reforms proposed in 1996 to the 
system of compilation of evidence of the Maltese courts. This is 
                                                                                                             
 55.  R. Cremona, Call on legal profession to give master system a proper 
try, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999 (Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). 
 56.  J. Brincat, The Alarm Clock, THE SUNDAY TIMES, May 18, 1997 
(Malta, Allied Newspapers Ltd.). 
 57.  Pullicino, supra note 51. 
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most evident in the case of the proposed system for compiling 
evidence through affidavits, which provoked lawyers’ protests that 
it obliged them to act unprofessionally. However even the 
proposed “pre-trial” and Master systems function by requiring the 
parties to state the facts as they see them at the start of the case in a 
less formal arena than that of ordinary litigation. In such a setting, 
lawyers would not have had such a clearly defined role as they 
have during a court-room trial and it would be more difficult for 
them to assert their detachment from the factual aspect of the case. 
Lawyers would be more personally involved in telling and 
validating their clients’ stories.       
In resisting these reforms, lawyers followed a well 
established tradition. As part of an attempt at reforming the 
Maltese courts, the British Royal Commission of 1913 had 
recommended that a written “declaration of facts” be submitted by 
litigating parties at the start of their lawsuit. While this requirement 
was incorporated into the law, it was negatively perceived by the 
lawyers, who scented a threat to their professional detachment. 
Their collective reaction was to draft these “declarations of facts” 
in such an elliptical way as to turn them into what are effectively 
summaries of the statements of the legal claims being made in the 
case; thus leaving the “facts” to emerge in the course of the oral 
court-room hearing.58    
Analogously, lawyers expressed resistance to the 1996 
procedural reforms in both direct and indirect ways. As the earlier-
quoted extract from the Chief Justice’s speech made clear, it was 
actually judges rather than lawyers who aborted the system of pre-
trial hearings by “clandestinely”59 introducing the Master system. 
However, as the Chief Justice also noted, they were anticipating 
the objections lawyers would make; given their objections to 
“certain systems of control on the process of compilation of 
evidence.”60 All Maltese judges are drawn from the pool of 
practising lawyers, together with whom they constitute a tightly-
                                                                                                             
 58. So as to explore this issue, I examined the first fifty law-suits filed in 
February 1997. There were only three instances in which the ‘declaration of 
facts’ filed by the plaintiff was substantially different from the ‘citazzjoni’ (the 
statement of the plaintiff’s legal claims), containing additional details which 
were not mentioned in it.  
 59.  Pullicino, supra note 51. 
 60.  Id. 
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knit court community. Maltese judges are keen to uphold their 
independence in the face of possible government interference. 
They are therefore disinclined to rigidly apply administrative 
reforms which could antagonise lawyers, especially if these 
reforms appear to raise problems of professional ethics. These 
attitudes seem also to have contributed to widespread non-
compliance with the rule that all evidence be produced in one court 
sitting and to a notable lack of enthusiasm for the new option of 
compiling most of the evidence by means of affidavits.  
Through their resistance Maltese lawyers managed to 
safeguard their understanding of their professional role in the face 
of administrative reforms which threatened to define it differently. 
While the logical implication of this analysis is that the causes of 
court delays are rooted in the way these lawyers have understood 
their professional role in litigation, it is important to avoid an 
overly idealistic account of these professional understandings. By 
leading lawyers to avoid taking responsibility for the “facts” and to 
insist that these must be proved by clients in the courtroom, they 
create room for various lawyerly tactics through which the process 
of producing evidence is made more elaborate and time 
consuming. These tactics depend for their success on the increased 
time it takes to produce oral, as opposed to written, evidence in 
court. Written affidavits also take less time to read and make it 
easier to establish the points of contrast and similarity between the 
versions of the different parties and their witnesses. Conversely, if 
the “facts” are orally produced, then it becomes possible to: 
1. Produce irrelevant testimony or contest all the 
evidence presented by one’s opponent in litigation. 
This is because the relevant “facts in issue” remain 
unclear for a longer time.  
2. Summon many witnesses to testify to the same 
“facts.” 
3. Conceal valuable evidence from the opposing 
party in litigation, until it becomes strategically 
appropriate to disclose it. 
The outcome of these tactics can be described as the 
“problematisation of evidence.” By referring to 
“problematisation,” I want to highlight how difficult and 
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problematic the process of compilation of evidence can be made 
and to suggest that such an outcome may often be actively 
intended. After all, it can be in the interest of both lawyers and 
their clients to create delays. In this way, lawyers can gain more 
control over the evolution of litigated cases and acquire more space 
to manoeuvre in the interests of their clients. Moreover, a client 
who looks set to lose a case may benefit from such delays. It 
seems, in brief, that professional interests may easily fuse with 
professional ideals in a powerful combination which explains the 
perseverance with which lawyers have resisted attempts to reform 
the system by which evidence is compiled.  
This analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a clear 
connection between the specific way in which Maltese lawyers 
interpret their professional role, pervasive court delays and the 
failure of Government efforts to reform the administration of 
justice. Other implications stem from a deeper consideration of the 
tactics through which the production of evidence is 
“problematised.” As I have shown, the leitmotif behind these 
tactics is that they create obstacles to the effort to bring “law” and 
“fact” into some sort of facile correspondence with each other, 
although creating such a correspondence is the central function of 
court litigation. By expressing professional ideals which separate 
“law” from “fact” and lawyer from client, these tactics also 
reinforce a particular way of imagining Maltese law, which 
constructs the legal domain in separatist, exclusive and self-
referential terms.61 The production of delay and inefficiency in 
court proceedings hence becomes invested with symbolic meaning. 
In particular, delay makes it possible for lawyers both to affirm and 
to traverse the distance between everyday and legal concepts of 
evidence, truth and reality. Delay is an intrinsic part of the 
processes by which the specificity of “the legal” is affirmed in 
practice. This inverts Nelken’s analysis, as delay appears as a tool 
by which lawyers themselves construct, in their own way and for 
their own purposes, the distinction between “internal” and 
“external” legal culture. 
 
                                                                                                             
 61.  CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 184 (Basic Books, New York, 1983). 
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VIII. DELAY AND THE “COLONIAL ENCOUNTER” 
 
Through delay Maltese lawyers cope with the specific 
demands of their clients by enacting specific professional 
understandings of legal representation as a matter of distancing 
“law” from “fact” by balancing between patronage and 
professional detachment. Yet these professional understandings 
must themselves be explained against the backdrop of Maltese 
legal history. In fact the resistance put up by the Maltese legal 
profession in the past to legal and judicial interventions by the 
British colonial authorities seems to have legitimised separatist and 
exclusive ways of conceiving of Maltese law and the lawyer’s 
professional role today. The emergence of such conceptions can be 
seen as being partly a by-product of the very process of attempting 
to describe the Maltese legal system in the context of unequal 
discursive exchanges between Maltese legal professionals and 
foreign colonial agents.  
In this regard it is interesting to take a look at the 
proceedings of a British Royal Commission which visited Malta in 
1911 (henceforth the “Mowatt Commission”).62 As part of its remit 
covered reforms to Maltese judicial procedure, the Commission, 
which was presided over by a British MP and two judges, 
interviewed various prominent personalities from the Maltese legal 
community, including the Chief Justice, the Crown Advocate 
General, the Court Registrar and the President of the Lawyers’ 
Association.63 These were questioned exhaustively on a range of 
subjects, focusing understandably on procedural issues which 
could be causally linked to delays in civil litigation. Most of the 
questions dealt with the procedures for opening a court case, 
giving testimony, conducting the hearing and appeals. Court 
officials were asked to provide statistics on the time which various 
proceedings took and on related costs. Yet these inquiries tended to 
raise broader issues concerning the nature of the legal system and 
key characteristics of Maltese law.  
                                                                                                             
 62.  Francis R. Mowatt & Mackenzie Chalmers, Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Finances, Economic Position and Judicial Procedure of 
Malta, in PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (London, 1912). 
 63. In Malta this is called the “Chamber of Advocates,” originally the 
“Camera degli Avvocati.” 
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A good example of the way in which procedural questions 
tended to evoke more substantive answers occurred when Sir 
Mackenzie Chalmers, one of the Commissioners, asked Mr. Leo 
Benjacar, the then Registrar of the Maltese Courts about a 
particular case—Cini v. Townsley. He immediately launched into 
an account of the facts of the case before being pulled up short by 
Chalmers, who informed him that: “We are not concerned with the 
merits of the claim, but with the length and nature of the 
proceedings.”64 More than a simple mistake, this exchange 
suggests a lower sensitivity on the part of the Maltese respondent 
to the distinction between procedural and substantive law, which is 
prominent in the common law tradition.65 Other answers are even 
more telling. Questioned about the maximum amount of days 
before an appeal can be put down for hearing in the list of the 
Court of Appeal, Mr Benjacar observed that this would amount to 
57 days, but that this period would apply “whether the amount is 
only £5 or whether it is £500.”66 He later attempted to justify the 
way court processes did not distinguish cases on the basis of their 
value:  
I should like to remark that it is not always the 
(financial) nature of the case that makes it a big 
case; very often it is the nature of the exceptions 
(legal pleas). Sometimes a case of a few pounds 
becomes an important case because of the nature of 
the exceptions.67  
What is being elaborated here is thus a conception of law as an 
autonomous field of activity possessing its own internal criteria of 
value and which ought not to be assessed in terms of external 
monetary criteria. This conception was itself developed in reaction 
to the Commissioners’ questions which were premised on the need 
to assess the cost and financial importance of cases, reserving full 
access to the legal process to those who had the means. Thus, in a 
                                                                                                             
 64.  Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 243. 
 65.  Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil 
Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001). 
 66.  Mowatt & Chalmer, supra note 61, at 235. 
 67.  Id. at 240. 
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statement redolent of a Victorian subordination of legal process to 
social hierarchy, Commissioner Chalmers suggested removing the 
possibility of an appeal in minor cases before the Magistrates’ 
court:  
We hold rather strongly that in these small cases 
between small people, where everything is irregular, 
the Judge ought rather to act as a judicial arbitrator 
and to decide on substantial merits than to work out 
points of law. The elaboration of points of law, 
where everything is irregular, between small people, 
is in fact, an injustice.68   
This picture of Maltese judicial proceedings as obeying an intrinsic 
logic which cannot be reduced to the financial interests or social 
hierarchies involved, is reinforced by another theme to which the 
Commissioners gave a lot of attention, which is the actual temporal 
schedule adopted by the courts to structure the hearing of cases. 
Since the Mowatt Commission had been instructed to tackle what 
the colonial authorities considered to be unacceptable delays in 
Maltese court cases, they tried to follow up particular cases to find 
out what caused these delays. They were clearly surprised to 
discover that the system adopted for the hearing of civil cases 
seemed to be based on the assumption that instead of a single 
session in which the case would be tried, there would be a series of 
hearings, which could reach thirty or forty over a number of years 
and which were usually separated from each other by periods of 
some three months or so. Each of these hearings was ostensibly 
dedicated to tackling a particular aspect of the trial, such as the 
examination of a particular witness, or a request for an 
interlocutory degree. Often, however, even these issues were not 
dealt with due to the failure of one of the witnesses or lawyers to 
“appear” in court. In any case the court would then adjourn the 
hearing to another date until all the aspects of the case had been 
tackled. On any particular day, the judge would have a list of thirty 
or forty cases scheduled to be tried in this piecemeal way by him.  
Various aspects of this “system” were criticized by the 
Commissioners, who observed that: “under that system a case of 
                                                                                                             
 68.  Id. at 278. 
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any complication may last indefinitely, because every witness 
suggests another.”69 They therefore made many suggestions to 
speed up this process, based on the way hearings were structured 
before the English courts. Yet most of these suggestions were 
rejected by their Maltese interlocutors, who tended to justify 
existing delays and to imply that speeding up court processes 
would be detrimental to justice. When asked whether Judges could 
limit themselves to scheduling four or five cases per day (instead 
of thirty or forty) and actually finish them, Mr. Benjacar objected 
that “It would come to this: that if one of the lawyers reported 
himself ill, the judge would lose a day.”70 When the 
Commissioners repeated this recommendation at a later stage, to 
the Advocate General, Dr. Frendo Azzopardi, he observed: “The 
question is whether a case can be disposed of in one or two 
sittings.”71 The way in which he justified this reluctance to even 
consider changing the system is interesting for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, he invoked the functional integrity and specificity of “the 
system” to try to blunt the Commission’s unfavourable 
comparisons of the Maltese hearings to those held before the 
English courts, observing: “When you have a certain system, all 
the details of that system work very well and correctly, but when 
you have to alter the whole system, it is very difficult.”72 Secondly, 
the above quoted extract implies that trying to speed up the trial 
unduly could lead to cases being “disposed of” in a way which is 
legally unsatisfactory. As Mr Benjacar claimed, when rejecting the 
idea that a case could be adjourned to the next day instead of three 
months, “You must give the plaintiff or the defendant, or their 
counsel, time to look up books or precedents.”73 
These quoted exchanges barely scratch the surface in terms 
of the insights that could be gleaned from a careful reading of the 
Mowatt Commission’s proceedings. But the above suffices to 
make clear the apparent continuity which exists between colonial 
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 70.  Id. at 240. 
 71.  Id. at 280. 
 72.  Id. at 281. 
 73.  Id. at 240. 
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and post-colonial reform projects for the Maltese courts74 and the 
discourses of resistance which they provoked. In both cases it is 
clear that the specificity of law is insisted upon and any attempt to 
reduce delays by changing the procedural rules relating to court 
trials is depicted by Maltese legal professionals as simultaneously 
threatening their professional identity and the integrity of the legal 
system. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of this research appear in sharper relief if 
it is placed in a comparative perspective. A touchstone is provided 
by Sally Merry’s75 study of the legal consciousness of working 
class American clients. She showed how these clients often view 
court proceedings as a way to escape the close and constricting 
communities in which they are embedded. Litigation offers the 
possibility of socially distancing oneself by asserting one’s rights 
as a citizen of a bureaucratically organised nation-state. By 
comparison, the present study focuses on the other side of the coin, 
by showing how lawyers try to socially distance themselves from 
their clients and invoke professional ideals for this purpose. Yet 
this professional detachment cannot always be maintained. Maltese 
lawyers cannot afford to excessively discourage their clients and 
must therefore walk the tightrope between patronage and 
professionalism. Paradoxically, this may create a situation where 
the professional ideals of lawyers are themselves utilised to service 
their patronage relationships with their clients; since they allow 
lawyers to create delays by “problematising” the compilation of 
evidence.    
This article aims to demonstrate how particular 
understandings of professional detachment represent practically 
motivated attempts on the part of advocates to symbolically 
separate law from fact and their role in litigation from that of their 
                                                                                                             
 74.  Indeed, affidavits, pre-trial hearings and the introduction of the office 
of the “Master of Rolls” were among the solutions considered by this 
commission. 
 75.  SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (Chicago University 
Press, Chicago, 1990). 
2011] MALTESE COURT DELAYS AND ETHNOGRAPHY 567 
 
 
 
clients. It further argues that the association between delay and 
professional detachment has a long history in Malta which is 
rooted in the relationship of opposition between formal (colonial) 
administration and informal (Maltese) law; an opposition which 
has been maintained and reproduced for over two hundred years. 
This may go some way towards explaining why Maltese law, a 
hybrid product that still bears the marks of its colonial origin, is a 
difficult and problematic medium of governance. The reasons why 
this is so are clearly evidenced by the prophetic words of Sir 
Adriano Dingli, drafter of the Maltese Civil Code, with which I 
would like to end this article. In 1880, in a letter appended to the 
Keenan report, which advocated the compulsory Anglicisation of 
the Maltese educational system, Dingli objected to this reform as:   
It would be the worst public course, for the 
attainment of the desired consummation, to resort to 
compulsory measures, in a place like Malta, where 
the effects would be disastrous to the immediate 
personal interests of the professional classes . . . 
perseverance in this might engender an acrimonious 
feeling, which the rising generation would share in, 
and which might continue long after its origin 
would be forgotten.76 
 
                                                                                                             
 76.  GEOFFREY HULL, THE MALTA LANGUAGE QUESTION: A CASE STUDY IN 
CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 30 (Said International, Malta, 1993).  
